In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DISTINGUISHING CHARITY AS GOODNESS AND PRUDENCE AS RIGHTNESS: A KEY TO THOMAS'S SECUNDA PARS JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J. Weston School of Theology Cambridge, Massachusetts HE RESPECTIVE functions of charity and prudence Thomas Aquinas's moral theology provide a key to his nderstanding of the virtues. Charity and prudence serve distinct functions. In Thomas's position, a person can have the acquired virtues without having charity; such a person has a (...) virtuous life, but it is unified by prudence, not by charity. But why is such a person without charity? Is this absence of charity due simply to the absence of faith? Is this person with the four acquired virtues but without charity simply an unbeliever? Or is this person simply a rightly-ordered person whose lack of charity is due to the absence of personal moral goodness? Is such a person simply one who, in common parlance, is a well-integrated person but not necessarily a morally good one? In a word, is moral goodness a necessary condition for the acquired moral virtues? To answer this question we will begin with the contemporary distinction between goodness and rightness and then discuss the two virtues and their functions. In the final section we will relate our findings to present-day problems in the ethics of virtue. I. Goodness an_d Rightness Since Democritus we have realized that living rightly is not necessarily an indication of being good. Democritus noted that being good required not only that we act rightly but that we want 407 408 JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J. to act rightly.1 Over the centuries philosophers and theologians have consistently made reference to the fact that living rightly, or as they called it " doing the good," was not a sufficient condition for describing a person as good. From Ambrose and Augustine to the present, authors have insisted that a moral description of persons is more than a mere deduction from external activity.2 Some writers, however, did not simply make reference to this distinction, but rather spent considerable time in commenting on the insight involved. Kant, for instance, in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals distinguished from the beginning between action!> done out of duty (Handeln aus Pfiicht) and dutiful actions (pfiichtmiissiges H andeln). In attempting to describe the only thing which we can call " good," that is, the will, Kant argued that a dutiful act was only good if the act was done out of duty. For example, a state executioner who executes on account of his duty to execute is good and the action is good. But if the executioner performs the dutiful act on some other account, then the action is not good, though it is dutiful. Interestingly Kant did not consider whether an act not dutiful could be called good: Is an executioner who acts out of duty but botches the job still to be called good? George Moore in his Ethics made a similar point but for different reasons. Unlike Kant's interest in goodness, Moore wanted to describe a right action free of any consideration of an agent's motives and his solution was utilitarianism. In the process of separating the agent's action, Moore realized that the right act of a person with bad motivations involves a paradox: " A man may actually deserve the strongest moral condemnation for choosing an action which is morally right." 3 However, like 1 See his Fragmenta M oralia, no. 109, as cited in Stephen Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 170. 2 Bruno Schuller of Miinster provides ample historical evidence in his Die Begrundung sittlicher Urteile (Diisseldorf: Patmos, 1980), 140. 3 George Moore, Ethics (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1912), 193-5. Cf. H. J. Paton, "The Alleged Independence of Goodness," in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. P. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1952), 113-134; Richard Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). GOODNESS AND PRUDENCE AS RIGHTNESS 409 Kant, Moore did not discuss a person who sought to act rightly but who failed actually to perform a right action. Contemporary moral theology has carried the distinction further. Moral theologians like Bruno... (shrink)

This paper examines flexibility in ad hoc networks and suggests that, even with cross-layer design as a mechanism to improve adaptation, a fundamental limitation exists in the ability of a single optimization function, defined a priori, to adapt the network to meet all quality-of-service requirements. Thus, code implementing multiple algorithms will have to be positioned within the network. Active networking and programmable networking enable unprecedented autonomy and flexibility for ad hoc communication networks. However, in order to best leverage the results (...) of active and programmable networking, metrics that indicate the nature and location of required flexibility need to be developed. The primary contribution of this paper is to propose a metric that couples network topological rate of change with the ability of a generic service to move itself to an optimal location in concert with the changing network. This metric points to a fundamental tradeoff among adaptation (changing service location), performance (sophistication or estimated minimum code size of the service), and the network’s ability to tune itself to a changing ad hoc network topology. (shrink)

This review article argues that John Kieschnick’s Buddhist Historiography in China (2022) constitutes a landmark in the field. The book covers a large swath of original sources, analyzes authorial strategies, and assesses the place of writing about the Buddhist past within the Sinocentric tradition of court-focused historiography. I point up the strengths of the book, identify its most significant chapters, and probe its interpretation of Buddhist historiography. I also suggest that, by including a broader range of genres within the ambit (...) of Buddhist historiography, future scholarship might add perspectives that diverge from those of the centralized state and the Saṃgha. (shrink)

This research concentrates on the design and analysis of an algorithm referred to as Virtual Network Configuration (VNC) which uses predicted future states of a system for faster network configuration and management. VNC is applied to the configuration of a wireless mobile ATM network. VNC is built on techniques from parallel discrete event simulation merged with constraints from real-time systems and applied to mobile ATM configuration and handoff. Configuration in a mobile network is a dynamic and continuous process. Factors such (...) as load, distance, capacity and topology are all constantly changing in a mobile environment. The VNC algorithm anticipates configuration changes and speeds the reconfiguration process by pre-computing and caching results. VNC propagates local prediction results throughout the VNC enhanced system. The Global Positioning System is an enabling technology for the use of VNC in mobile networks because it provides location information and accurate time for each node. This research has resulted in well defined structures for the encapsulation of physical processes within Logical Processes and a generic library for enhancing a system with VNC. Enhancing an existing system with VNC is straight forward assuming the existing physical processes do not have side effects. The benefit of prediction is gained at the cost of additional traffic and processing. This research includes an analysis of VNC and suggestions for optimization of the VNC algorithm and its parameters. (shrink)

Examining the influence of ancient Greek philosophy, as well as of the Arabian and Hebrew scholars who transmitted it, The A to Z of Medieval Philosophy and Theology presents the philosophy of the Christian West from the 9th to the early 17th century. This is accomplished through a chronology, an introduction, appendixes, a bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on the philosophers, concepts, issues, institutions, and events, making this an important reference for the study of the progression of human (...) thought. (shrink)

Modern developments in philosophy have provided us with tools, logical and methodological, that were not available to Medieval thinkers - a development that has its dangers as well as opportunities. Modern tools allow one to penetrate old texts and analyze old problems in new ways, offering interpretations that the old thinkers could not have known. But unless one remains sensitive to the fact that language has undergone changes, bringing with it a shift in the meaning of terminology, one can easily (...) perpetrate an anachronism. Yet there is a growing need to bring modern tools and to bear on the struggle for greater understanding of the problems studied and the solutions found by the ancient scholars. If we remain sensitive to the dangers, this openness to new methods can be expected to widen our perspectives and deepen our knowledge of old material. The focus in the present volume is on problems in Medieval and contemporary philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This is a brief letter outlining speculative ideas for semantic web reasoning about information assurance. Much work has been done on the development of semantic web applications for reasoning about information assurance. A significant portion of this work is focused upon semantic web ontologies and reasoning about security policies and the underlying implementation of those policies. While numerous semantic web-based security policy ontologies and reasoners exist, both academically and commercially, I will briefly focus on ideas related to solutions to the (...) problem of managing semantic web rules using algorithmic information theory. (shrink)

:The most basic question one can ask of a model is ‘What is the effect on variable y2 of variable y1?’ Causation is ‘implementation neutral’ when all interventions on external variables that lead to a given change in y1 have the same effect on y2, so that the effect of y1 on y2 is defined unambiguously. Familiar ideas of causal analysis do not apply when causation is implementation neutral. For example, a cause variable cannot be linked to an effect variable (...) by both a direct path and a distinct indirect path. Discussion of empirical aspects of implementation neutrality leads to further unexpected results, such as that if one variable causes another the coefficient representing that causal link is always identified. (shrink)

The Middle Ages is often viewed as a period of low intellectual achievement. The name itself refers to the time between the high philosophical and literary accomplishments of the Greco-Roman world and the technological advances that were achieved and philosophical and theological alternatives that were formulated in the modern world that followed. However, having produced such great philosophers as Anselm, Peter Abelard, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Peter Lombard, and the towering Thomas Aquinas, it hardly seems fair to label (...) the medieval period as such. Examining the influence of ancient Greek philosophy as well as of the Arabian and Hebrew scholars who transmitted it, the Historical Dictionary of Medieval Philosophy and Theology presents the philosophy of the Christian West from the 9th to the early 17th century. This is accomplished through a chronology, an introduction, appendixes, a bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on the philosophers, concepts, issues, institutions, and events, making this an important reference for the study of the progression of human thought. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger cited him as “the most potent philosophical power... in all of contemporary philosophy.” Ortega y Gasset called him “the first man of genius, the Adam of the new Paradise.” Writing at a crucial time in intellectual history, his influence has extended to persons as diverse as Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Karol Wojtyla, Jurgen Habermas, Ernst Bloch, and members of the generation of thinkers that developed in the German universities during the Weimar years. Despite this far-reaching impact, the (...) social theory and philosophy of Max Scheler have never been examined for the significance of their political thought. This book opens the possibility of deriving a contemporary political theory from Scheler’s philosophy and social theory, based on his understanding of the person, the community, and the significant new directions these elements suggest. Standing at some distance from modern liberalism, conservatism, and Marxism, both in their bourgeois and Enlightenment varieties, Scheler’s personalism has its roots in the rich admixture of life philosophy and phenomenology that gave rise to Martin Heidegger’s early philosophy. It is a philosophical anthropology founded on Scheler’s own realist phenomenology, sociology of knowledge, and non-formal ethics. The book considers Scheler’s many works and includes translations and reviews of unpublished materials. It includes an extensive bibliography of primary and secondary name sources. (shrink)

Wilkins & Wakefield are clearly right to separate linguistic capacity from communicative ability, if only because other animal species have one without the other. But I question the abruptness of the demarcation they make between a period when hominids evolved enriched conceptual representation for other reasons entirely, and a subsequent later stage when language use became an adaptation.

I support the application of the “evolution as tinkering” idea to vocalization and emphasize that some of the subcortical parts of the brain circuits used for speech organs retain features common to nonprimate mammals, and in some cases to lower vertebrates, pointing up the importance of cortical evolution as suggested by MacNeilage.

One can disagree with Müller that it is neurobiologically questionable to suppose that human language is innate, specialized, and species-specific, yet agree that the precise brain mechanisms controlling language in any individual will be influenced by epigenesis and genetic variability, and that the interplay between inherited and acquired aspects of linguistic capacity deserves to be investigated.

I do not disagree with the argument that human-population right-handedness may in some way be a consequence of the population-level left-lateralization of language. But I suggest that the human functional lateralization is not dependent on the structural left-right brain asymmetries to which Corballis refers.

The title of this Festschrift to Stephen Brown points to the understanding of medieval philosophy and theology in the longue durée of their traditions and discourses.

This paper extends a stochastic theory for buffer fill distribution for multiple “on‘ and “off‘ sources to a mobile environment. Queue fill distribution is described by a set of differential equations assuming sources alternate asynchronously between exponentially distributed periods in “on‘ and “off‘ states. This paper includes the probabilities that mobile sources have links to a given queue. The sources represent mobile user nodes, and the queue represents the capacity of a switch. This paper presents a method of analysis which (...) uses mobile parameters such as speed, call rates per unit area, cell area, and call duration and determines queue fill distribution at the ATM cell level. The analytic results are compared with simulation results. (shrink)

A highly useful resource for professionals and students alike, this cutting-edge, first-of-its-kind book provides a thorough introduction to nanoscale communication networks. Written in a clear tutorial style, this volume covers a wide range of the most important topics in the area, from molecular communication and carbon nanotube nano-networks, to nanoscale quantum networking and the future direction of nano networks. Moreover, the book features numerous exercise problems at the end of each chapter to ensure a solid understanding of the material.

In “The Will to Believe,” William James affirms that we have some control over what we believe and asks how this control should be exercised. He rejects the evidentialists’ view that we ought to believe only when intellectual grounds make it quite sure that the belief is true. For him, “options” are choices among contrary beliefs. Some options are “living,” “forced,” and “momentous.” James’ thesis concerns belief-options that have these three features and where proof as to the truth is unavailable. (...) He holds that in such cases we have a right to believe, provided believing has better consequences than not believing would. James is correct that sometimes it is permissible to believe without adequate grounds. His view is misleading, though, when he leaves the impression that this is so only where the option is living, forced, momentous, and not settleable by evidence. The right to believe has broader scope than this. Moreover, James’ right to believe presupposes a view of truth at odds with his later pragmatism. (shrink)